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Knight v. Florida
120 S. Ct. 459 (1999)
(denial of certiorari)
I. Background
Thomas Knight ("Knight") and Carey Dean Moore ("Moore") each
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari asking the Court
to consider whether inordinately long delays in execution constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.' Comparisons to other nations' death penalty
laws and practices were made in support of petitioners' claims.2 However,
the Supreme Court declined to decide whether lengthy delays in execution
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment and denied both petitions for writs of certiorari.' Although the denial
did not constitute a ruling on the merits, it seems that the Court has clearly
decided that delays, even in excess of twenty years, do not raise constitu-
tional concerns." This essay explores the extent to which international law
and practices inform and influence death penalty jurisprudence in the
United States ("U.S."). Despite a number of countries' support for the idea
that excessive delays are cruel and contrary to their own constitutional
principles, the United States Supreme Court has refused to adopt this
position.'
I. The Cases' Procedural Histories
Moore was sentenced to death in Nebraska in June 1980. By 1988, he
had exhausted all of his direct appeals and state collateral remedies. Moore
next petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court and was
granted relief upon the court's finding that Nebraska's capital sentencing
procedures were unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion. Nebraska then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
1. Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459 (1999) (denial of certiorarz) (denying writs of
certiorari for petitioners Thomas Knight and Carey Dean Moore).
2. Id. at 462-63.
3. Id. at 459.
4. See id. (citing Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184 (1995)).
5. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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certiorari, but was denied. Nebraska revised its death penalty sentencing
scheme and once again sentenced Moore to death in another proceeding held
in April 1995, fifteen years after Moore's first sentencing hearing. Once
again, Moore was sentenced to death and by 1997, had lost all of his direct
appeals and had invoked state collateral remedies without success.6
Knight, sentenced to death in Florida in April 1975, exhausted all of his
state appeals by 1983 and filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
courts. In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Florida's death penalty sentencing procedure was constitu-
tionally defective and ordered a new sentencing proceeding. Florida revised
its sentencing procedure and held a new hearing for Knight where he was
again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the death
sentence. Knight then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ
of certiorari to review his claim of inordinate delay.7
III. Differing Opinions: Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer
Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of the writs of certiorari,
disparaged the notion that one could fully take advantage of all of the
procedural remedies available to defendants sentenced to death and then go
on to complain of excessive delay.8 Justice Thomas disagreed with the idea
that an Eighth Amendment speedy execution claim is in accord with U.S.
jurisprudence and cited several state and lower federal court decisions that
reached similar conclusions.' He opined that consistency would seem to
require that those who take advantage of the death penalty appeals process
also need to accept lengthy delays in execution as its consequence.' Because
there is no U.S. legal authority supporting the notion that defendants may
utilize their procedural remedies and then claim delay, petitioners were
forced to rely upon foreign authorities to substantiate their claims.1
In contrast, Justice Breyer, dissenting from the Court's denial of certio-
rari, found that a state's failure to comply with constitutional demands
which results in decades-long delays raises a "strong" Eighth Amendment
claim of inhumane punishment. 2 He cited cases and statistics showing that
many inmates on death row suffer extensively from depression, suicidal
6. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 461-62.
7. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida's sentencing procedure was defective
because it failed to require the jury to consider evidence of an "unusually traumatic and
abusive childhood" as a potential mitigating factor. Id. at 462.
8. Id at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
9. Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 460.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 461 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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tendencies, and sometimes insanity." Justice Breyer documented recogni-
tion by U.S. courts, dating as far back as the late 1800s, of the suffering
caused by prolonged waits for execution.14 He then noted that lengthy
delays could not be justified on the basis of our constitutional tradition, as
delays in execution of decades were unheard of at the time of the drafting of
the Constitution." Furthermore, he disagreed with Justice Thomas's
assertion that lower courts have resoundingly rejected the type of speedy
execution claim advanced in Knight. 6 After a closer examination of the
lower court cases, Justice Breyer concluded that those courts had yet to
address significantly a state's responsibility for delays.'
Justice Breyer also surveyed the death penalty jurisprudence of other
nations to reinforce his view that state-caused extended delays in execution
may indeed constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. 8 Justice Breyer cited several examples of nations which have
acknowledged that lengthy delays implicate constitutional concerns. 9 For
instance, Jamaica's Privy Council held that any delay exceeding five years,
unless the defendant was entirely at fault, was "inhuman or degrading
punishment" in violation of the Jamaican Constitution."0 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe found that delays of five and six years were
"inordinate" and constituted "torture... or inhuman ... degrading punish-
ment."2 Justice Breyer also referred to the Supreme Court of India's re-
quirement that all appellate courts take delay into account when deciding
whether to impose a death sentence.22 Finally, in Soering v. United King-
doma, 23 the European Court of Human Rights prohibited the United King-
13. Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
14. Id. (citing Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995); In re Medley, 134 U.S.
160, 172 (1890); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 288-89 (1972) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring); Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S.
9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 464-65.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 462-65.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 462-63; see Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C.U.K. 1, 18,
[1993] 4 All E.R. 769, 783, available in 1993 WL 963003 (PC 1993) (en banc) (holding that
execution should take place as soon as reasonably practicable after imposition of sentence and
that to carry out executions after a delay of fourteen years would constitute inhuman
punishment contrary the Jamaican Constitution).
21. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 463; see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimba-
bwe v. Attorney-General (1993] 1 Zimb. L.R. 239, 240, 269(S), 271 (Aug. 4, 1999),
< http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salr/catholic.html > (vacating four death sentences because the
prolonged delays in execution were constitutionally impermissible).
22. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 463 (citing Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465).
23. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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dom from extraditing a defendant to Virginia because the average six to
eight year delay in execution constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading
punishment in contravention of the European Convention on Human
Rights.2"
IV The Influence of International Law and Practice on
US. Death Penalty Jurisprudence
To bolster his argument that international law should influence U.S.
jurisprudence, Justice Breyer cited over a half dozen cases supporting his
assertion that the Court has "long considered relevant and informative"
foreign courts' application of comparable constitutional standards under
similar conditions." Justice Breyer acknowledged the utility of looking to
opinions of the world's courts, notwithstanding the fact that these opinions
are non-binding on the courts of the U.S.26 However, there are a number
of mechanisms that may indeed bind the United States under international
law, such as international agreements/treaties, regional agreements/treaties,
customary international law, andjus cogens norms.27 There are at least four
international instruments relevant to death penalty law which arguably bind
the U.S.: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration"),28 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR), 29 the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention")," and
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("Conven-
tion").31
Although not a treaty, the Declaration, adopted by the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations in 1948, is often referred to as part of the "consti-
24. Id. at 439, 478, & 111.
25. Knight, 120 S. Ct. at 463-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,830-31 (1988) (Stevens, J, plurality opinion); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 n.8,
718-719 n.16 (1997); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,583-84 n.25, 588 (1961); Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183-89 (1881)).
26. Id. at 464.
27. See Christy A. Short, Comment, The Abolition of the Death Penalty: Does "Aboli.
tion"Really Mean What You Think it Means?, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 721, 724-31,
740-54 (1999).
28. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
Declaration].
29. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter Covenant].
30. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
31. G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, U.N. GAOR., 44thSess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter Convention].
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tutional structure of the world community."32 The Declaration establishes
a global commitment to forbid "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," and also asserts that all people have a right to life." Though
it is noteworthy because it forms the basis of many concepts in international
human rights law, the Declaration has greater significance as a moral docu-
ment than a legal one.34
As of 1997, 140 nations were parties to the ICCPR which was ratified
by the U.S. in June 1992." The ICCPR establishes standards on how the
death penalty should be imposed by countries that have yet to abolish
capital punishment. 6 However, the extent to which the U.S. is bound by
the ICCPR is restricted by the reservations the U.S. attached to its accep-
tance,37 such as the reservation attached to Article 6, paragraph 5, which
prohibits the execution of persons who were below the age of eighteen at
the time of their offense. 8 It is significant to note that the U.S. is greatly
out of step with the rest of the world on the issue of putting juvenile offend-
ers to death. Only five countries besides the U.S.-Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Iran-have executed juvenile offenders in the last
decade.39
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed but not ratified by
the U.S., also prohibits the execution of individuals who were seventeen
years old and younger at the time they committed the crime.' International
law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dictate that the U.S.
"respect the object and purpose of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child until such time as it ratifies the treaty."4' However, as noted above,
the U.S. has chosen not to follow this international precept.
The Vienna Convention, adopted in 1963 by 100 countries including
the U.S., mandates that a foreign national arrested in another country be
allowed to notify and receive assistance from the Consul of the country
32. Short, supra note 27, at 725 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Declaration, supra note 28, at art. 3, 5.
34. See Short, supra note 27, at 725.
35. Id. at 726.
36. Covenant, supra note 29, at art 6.
37. Short, supra note 27, at 741.
38. Colloquy, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death Penalty
System Inconsistent with International Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2793, 2811
(1999); see Covenant, supra note 29, at art 6.
39. National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, America's Shame- Killing Kids
(visited Feb. 10, 2000) < http://www.ncadp.org >.
40. Colloquy, supra note 38, at 2797.
41. Id. at 2812.
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where he holds citizenship." Breard v. Greene43 illustrates the U.S. legal
position pertaining to the Vienna Convention. Breard, a citizen of Para-
guay, was convicted of capital murder in Virginia and sentenced to death."
Breard sought federal habeas relief, alleging that his conviction violated the
Vienna Convention because he was not allowed to contact his consulate."
The Paraguayan government and certain of its officials filed a separate suit
in federal district court claiming that their rights under the Vienna Conven-
tion were also violated.' The district court dismissed the suit for want of
subject matter jurisdiction." Five years later, the Republic of Paraguay
began proceedings against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice
("ICJ")." The ICJ issued an order requesting that the U.S. stay Breard's
execution until the ICJ concluded proceedings on the matter.49 Accord-
ingly, Breard filed a writ of habeas corpus and an application to stay the
execution in the United States Supreme Court.s' Despite the ICJ's order,
the Supreme Court held that because Breard had not raised his Vienna
Convention claim in state court, it had been procedurally defaulted.5 ' The
Court concluded that the "procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of [a] treaty in that State." 2 Consequently, U.S. procedural
default rules applied. The Court noted that although treaties are considered
"supreme law of the land," they are trumped where they conflict with the
United States Constitution and congressional acts. 3
The U.S.'s reservations to the ICCPR, ambivalence to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and attitude towards the Vienna Convention as
articulated in Breard reflect a reluctance to conform to or be influenced by
international standards and practices as they relate to the death penalty.
Furthermore, that the U.S. deviates from many of its allies and contempo-
42. Mary K. Martin, Case Note, CAP. DEF. J., Spring 1998 at 17 (analyzing Breard v.
Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998)).
43. 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
44. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372-73 (1998) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 373. Specifically, Breard argued that the arresting authorities' failure to
inform him of his right to contact the Paraguayan Consulate resulted in a violation of the
Vienna Convention. Id.
46. Id. at 374. The suit alleged that the Republic of Paraguay, the Paraguayan Ambassa-
dor to the U.S., and the Consul General to Paraguay had their rights violated under the
Vienna Convention when the U.S. failed to inform Breard of his rights under the Convention





51. Id. at 375-76.
52. Id. at 375.
53. Id. at 376.
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raries evidences its unwillingness to be affected by international trends. For
instance, as of 1999, 106 countries had abolished the death penalty either in
law or in practice.' The only nations carrying out more executions than
the U.S.'s sixty-eight in 1998 were China and the Congo.5 Cuba and
Nigeria-often criticized by the U.S. for their human rights
records-regortedly carried out five and six executions, respectively, in that
same year. 6 Furthermore, in June 1999, Russia commuted the death sen-
tences of all 716 of its death row convicts." The U.S.'s death penalty
jurisprudence has thus far largely ignored these global movements toward
abolition and reform. The U.S. Supreme Court's denial of writ of certiorari
in Knight is consistent with the U.S.'s tendency to resist looking to its
international neighbors to inform U.S. death penalty law and policy.
Latanya R. White
54. Death Penalty Information Center, TheDeath Penalty: An International Perspective
(visited February 10, 2000) < http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicintl.html >.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Angela Charlton, Yelstin Commutes Death Sentences, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3,
1999, available in 1999 WL 17810155.
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